According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as (...) cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom. (shrink)

In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.

El presente texto señala algunas de las categorías fundamentales de la crítica de arte de Octavio Paz entre 1950 y 1967 como aparición y poesía, para demostrar que la noción de “ruptura” se retoma en la década de los sesenta para realizar un cuestionamiento profundo a la modernidad mexicana, sugiriendo una teoría de la posmodernidad y de la neovanguardia local. Además del texto llamado “Tamayo en la pintura mexicana” (1950), se hará referencia a otros cinco ensayos escritos en la década (...) del sesenta, en los que se puede encontrar un programa y una conceptualización de su crítica, sustentada en lecturas que realiza de Kant, Heidegger y del estructuralismo, entre otros, cuya influencia es evidente. Además, se señalará que la crítica de arte de Paz es constitutiva de su pensamiento general. (shrink)

El presente texto señala algunas de las categorías fundamentales de la crítica de arte de Octavio Paz entre 1950 y 1967 como aparición y poesía, para demostrar que la noción de “ruptura” se retoma en la década de los sesenta para realizar un cuestionamiento profundo a la modernidad mexicana, sugiriendo una teoría de la posmodernidad y de la neovanguardia local. Además del texto llamado “Tamayo en la pintura mexicana” (1950), se hará referencia a otros cinco ensayos escritos en la década (...) del sesenta, en los que se puede encontrar un programa y una conceptualización de su crítica, sustentada en lecturas que realiza de Kant, Heidegger y del estructuralismo, entre otros, cuya influencia es evidente. Además, se señalará que la crítica de arte de Paz es constitutiva de su pensamiento general. (shrink)

Brandom explains perceptual knowledge as the product of two distinguishable sorts of capacities: the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli; and the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlement of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind (...) spot, which makes Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects and to explain how we can justify the attributions of reliability to observers that make observation reports. (shrink)

In ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual...

In Part VIII of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, after criticizing one of the forms that the Myth of the Given adopts, Sellars presents his own conception of epistemic justification. This conception, along with his criticism of the framework of the Given, has had a great impact on the analytic philosophy of the second half of twentieth century, an impact that still persists today.1 In this article, I aim to examine Sellars's theory of epistemic justification in order to highlight (...) two important problems with it. The first concerns the justification of observation reports; the second concerns the understanding of those reports. Certainly, the problems I refer to have already been discussed by... (shrink)

Naïve realism is the view according to which perception is a non-representational relation of conscious awareness to mind-independent objects and properties. According to this approach, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by just the objects, properties, or facts presented to the senses. In this article, I argue that such a conception of the phenomenology of experience faces a clear counter-example, i.e., the experience of seeing aspects. The discussion suggests that, to accommodating such a kind of experience, it must be (...) acknowledged that perception is, at least in part, representational. (shrink)

According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a (...) blind spot, which makes Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects. (shrink)

En este artículo propongo una variedad de conceptualismo contra la objeción no conceptualista de acuerdo con la cual los enfoques no conceptualistas no serían capaces de explicar apropiadamente la percepción animal. En primer lugar, sintetizo la posición de McDowell sobre las mentes animales. En segundo lugar, señalo algunos problemas conceptuales en ella. En tercer lugar, sugiero una extensión del conceptualismo al reino animal a fin de resolver las inconsistencias de McDowell y de acomodar cierta evidencia empírica acerca de algunas capacidades (...) intelectuales atribuidas a algunos animales. Finalmente, presento dos argumentos para rechazar el no conceptualismo. La posición resultante es una versión mínima o deflacionada de conceptualismo de acuerdo con la cual ciertos animales no humanos son capaces de participar del espacio lógico de las razones aun cuando no sean capaces de justificar sus creencias o acciones. (shrink)

This paper discusses two dogmas attributed to Davidson’s coherentism. The first dogma says that perceptual experience is only a causal link between the world and beliefs. The second one says that only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Against these two statements it is argued that the conception of perceptual experience as a mere causal link between the world and our beliefs makes the world unknowable. Moreover, the article presents some additional reasons against that conception: it misses the phenomenological and perspectival (...) character of perception, and its independence from belief. Finally, Davidsonian externalism is considered. It is shown here that Davidson’s conception of experience makes it impossible to individuate the contents of beliefs. The article concludes rehabilitating the empiricist idea according to which perceptual experience can be used to justify beliefs. (shrink)

It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane’s (...) arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will try to show, in contrast, that they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane claims, perceptual content could after all be propositional in nature. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 740-754, June 2022.

It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss (...) Crane’s arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will try to show, in contrast, that they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane claims, perceptual content could after all be propositional in nature. (shrink)

For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in (...) a certain kind of relation with them, which makes them available to us, nevertheless, to be represented in judgement or belief. The question arises, however, whether this does not imply a new fall into the Myth of the Given. In this article, I argue for an affirmative response to that question. (shrink)

“Peirce, Wittgenstein and Davidson: Anti-skeptic Coincidences”. This paper shows some similarities among Peirce’s, Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s answers to skepticism. In each case, the response to Cartesian skepticism consist in pointing out the contradictory character of the skeptical doubt in itself. More specifically, those philosophers agree on the following points: (i) in order to face the challenge of skepticism we have to examine its bases without conceding the terms of the challenge; (ii) the skeptic cannot doubt without assuming some propositional contents (...) as true. In this sense, the skeptic commits performative contradiction; (iii) in his challenge, the skeptic omits the practical dimension of language and knowledge. That is the source of his difficulties. (shrink)

El presente artículo responde algunas objeciones que Damiani, en su trabajo “Comunidad, realidad y pragmatismo”, efectúa a un artículo anterior mío sobre lo incognoscible en Peirce: “Lo incognoscible y los límites del sentido”. Señalo que nuestros desacuerdos conciernen principalmente a dos puntos: si tiene sentido sostener que no podemos saber si hay incognoscibles, y si cabe defender la tesis de Peirce sin comprometerse con el idealismo. Al argumentar por una respuesta afirmativa al primer punto y por una negativa al segundo, (...) intento justificar una actitud agnóstica respecto de lo incognoscible: la de que no podemos saber si hay incognoscibles. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la discusión entre Taylor y Rorty sobre los resultados de la superación de la epistemología. Primeramente, este artículo resume la crítica de Taylor a Rorty. En segundo lugar, considera la respuesta rortyana a Taylor y sus propios argumentos contra el realismo de Taylor. Los desacuerdos principales entre Rorty y Taylor son los siguientes: 1) Rorty dice que el pragmatismo supera la epistemología, mientras que Taylor dice que el realismo no-comprometido es el que supera la tradición epistemológica popular; (...) 2) ellos están en desacuerdo sobre cómo entender cierto vocabulario: Taylor afirma que siempre es posible conocer qué vocabulario describe mejor al mundo, pero Rorty parece sostener que los vocabularios son inconmensurables; 3) Taylor piensa a la verdad como una relación de correspondencia con el mundo; Rorty, sin embargo, rechaza esta concepción. En tercer lugar, se hace aquí una evaluación de los argumentos ofrecidos por cada lado, especialmente la sección que argumenta contra la concepción rortyana de los juegos del lenguaje y sus consecuencias no-realistas. Finalmente, se sugiere una reconsideración de la dicotomía realismo-pragmatismo. (shrink)

Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creer, Gedisa, México, 2021, 272 pp.

order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of the paper is the following: first, Williams’ physicalist program (...) is described. Secondly, the article presents some objections to Williams’ physicalism. Thirdly, some reasons are given against the notion of objectivity as a point of view without perspective in. (shrink)

El empirismo puede ser caracterizado, por un lado, como una teoría acerca de los orígenes del conocimiento empírico; por otro, como una concepción epistémica acerca de la justificación de las creencias empíricas. Actualmente, esta última dimensión del empirismo ha sido criticada por diversos filósofos. Paradigmáticamente, Rorty ha sostenido que la experiencia es únicamente la causa de las creencias, pero no su justificación. La tesis de Rorty es que las creencias se relacionan con el mundo sólo causalmente. Este artículo posee dos (...) partes. En la primera, se argumenta, en contra de Rorty, que la experiencia debe ser una instancia de justificación si las creencias han de tener algún contenido. En la segunda, se propone una concepción pragmatista alternativa, que i) atribuye un papel epistémico a la experiencia sin recaer en "el mito de lo dado"; y ii) reintroduce el concepto de "representación" sin comprometerse con el representacionismo. Empiricism can be characterized, on the one hand, as a theory about the sources of empirical knowledge; on the other hand, as an epistemic outlook about justification of empirical beliefs. This last dimension of empiricism has been criticized by many philosophers nowadays. Paradigmatically, Rorty has said that experience is only the cause of beliefs, but not its justification. Rorty's thesis is that beliefs relate to the world only causally. This paper has two parts. In the first it is argued, against Rorty, that experience must be an epistemic instance of justification if beliefs are to have any objective content at all. In the second, it is proposed an alternative pragmatist conception of knowledge which i) attributes an epistemic role to experience without falling into "the myth of the given" and ii) reintroduces the concept of "representation" without compromising with representationalism. (shrink)

order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of the paper is the following: first, Williams’ physicalist program (...) is described. Secondly, the article presents some objections to Williams’ physicalism. Thirdly, some reasons are given against the notion of objectivity as a point of view without perspective in. (shrink)

This paper examines Rorty´s theory of truth in reference to concepts such as “falibilism” and “progress”. First, it claims that Rorty mixes inconsistently the pragmatist conception of truth, the Davidsonian thesis that “true” is a primitive and the deflacionist conception of truth. Secondly, it analyses the Rortyan attempt to “reduce” “true”” to “warranted assertibility” in order to show that this move is imcompatible with falibilism. It is argued that the distinction between truth and justification is essential to conceiving falibilism. Finally, (...) it is held that Rorty´s pragmatism is unable to explain scientific and philosophical progress. Three points in the Rortyan philosophy can be pointed out for that thesis: 1) incommensurability of vocabularies, 2) the idea that there is no reason to think that the beliefs best justified are those which are most likely to be true, 3) the “reduction” of “true” to “warranted assertibility”. (shrink)

Recently, some philosophers of mind have called the attention to the idea according to which we can perceive, in many cases, some mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals: the co-presence thesis and the hybrid model. We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts that allows us to avoid these objections. In a nutshell, our idea is that by perceiving (...) other people’s behaviors we perceive their mental states because behaviors co-present some features of the latter that go beyond the former, and this perception of others’ minds is direct an immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of mental states. (shrink)

We reconsider the Myerson value and the position value for communication situations. In case the underlying game is a unanimity game, we show that each of these values can be computed using the inclusion--exclusion principle. Linearity of both values permits us to calculate them without needing the dividends of the induced games (graph-restricted game and link game). The expression of these dividends is only derived in the existing literature for special communication situations. Moreover, the associated inclusion--exclusion decomposability property depends on (...) what we have called the graph allocation rule. This rule is the relative degree (relative indicator) for the position value (Myerson value). (shrink)

If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call “intellectualism” and “minimalism.” In this paper, we outline a new account of doxastic revision — “the first-order model”— that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic revision, we argue, is a personal-level process in which a creature rejects some beliefs and accepts others based on reasons. However, it does (...) not involve second-order thinking or sophisticated semantic and epistemic concepts. Besides defending that there is conceptual space for this alternative, we explore the possibility of extending it to some non-human animals. Based on our interpretation of some empirical evidence, we conclude that there are initial reasons to think that some animals — i.e., great apes— might be able to correct their beliefs in the way that our first-order model suggests. (shrink)

RESUMEN El presente artículo está dirigido a sistematizar una concepción teórica y metodológica que sustente el proceso de extensión universitaria en la carrera de Medicina en Cuba. Entre los resultados se destaca el lugar y papel de la extensión universitaria en el sistema de la formación integral del profesional a la que se asigna una connotación especial, de marcado contenido axiológico, coherente con las necesidades y proyecciones sociales que facilita la formación del educando y fortalece la relación institución-comunidad. Es factible (...) de ser aplicado pues puede devenir en una importante contribución a elevar el impacto social de la docencia médica en tanto atiendan aspectos como la preparación de los implicados en las diferentes instancias; la colaboración de los consejos populares y los factores de la comunidad que se manifiestan en el modo de actuación del profesional. ABSTRACT The present article is directed to systematize a theoretical and methodological conception that sustains the process of university extension in the career of Cuban medicine. Among the results he/she stands out the place and paper of the university extension in the system of the integral formation from the professional to which a special connotation is assigned, of marked axiological contained, coherent with the necessities and social projections that it facilitates the formation of the educating and it strengthens the relationship institution-community. It is feasible of being applied then it can become in an important contribution to elevate the social impact of the medical teaching as long as they assist aspects like the preparation of those implied in the different instances; the collaboration of the popular advice and the factors of the community that are manifested in the way of the professional's performance. (shrink)

The Air Quality Index (AQI) shows the state of air pollution in a unique and more understandable way. This work aims to forecast the AQI in Algeciras (Spain) 8 hours in advance. The AQI is calculated indirectly through the predicted concentrations of five pollutants (O3, NO2, CO, SO2 and PM10) to achieve this goal. Artificial neural networks (ANNs), sequence-to-sequence long short-term memory networks (LSTMs) and a newly proposed method combing a rolling window with the latter (LSTMNA) are employed as the (...) forecasting techniques. Besides, two input approaches are evaluated: using only the data from the own time series of the pollutant in the first case or adding exogenous variables in the second one. Several window sizes are employed (24, 28 and 72 hours) with ANNs and LSTMNAs. Additionally, several feature ranking methods are applied in the exogenous approach to select the most relevant lagged variables to feed the models. Results show how the proposed exogenous approach increases the performance of the prediction models. Besides, the newly proposed method LSTMNA provides the best performances in most of the cases evaluated. Hence, it constitutes an exciting alternative to standard LSTMs and ANNs to predict pollutants concentrations and, consequently, the AQI. (shrink)

Este artículo explora los recursos narrativos y visuales planteados en el cómic colombiano, desde 1992 hasta nuestros días, para describir representaciones distópicas de la ciudad de Bogotá. La distopía se entiende, en términos generales, como una visión negativa, para la humanidad, de un futuro posible o de un presente alterno, y se clasifica acá en distopías de fallo tecnológico, distopías de coerción simbólica/ coerción física, distopías de apocalipsis zombie/infectado y distopías de apocalipsis sobrenatural/no humano. Para la investigación se recopilaron las (...) publicaciones impresas disponibles desde 1992, de los cuales se seleccionaron aquellos que sucedieran o hicieran referencia a la ciudad de Bogotá. De los 45 cómics que cumplían dicho criterio, se identificaron y analizaron las 28 piezas que presentaron un escenario distópico. Entre los hallazgos fundamentales se encontró que la violencia y el conflicto, tanto simbólicos como físicos, son constantes en los diferentes escenarios distópicos identificados en la muestra, lo que refleja y proyecta la violencia histórica que vive un país como Colombia. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se revisan aspectos puntuales de las teorías de Enrique Dussel y Ernesto Laclau, poniéndose especial énfasis en la relevancia de la dimensión ética para la comprensión de la distancia entre una y otra posición teórica. El desarrollo de la argumentación procura demostrar una hipótesis que puede sintetizarse en tres núcleos específicos: la importancia de la relación entre ética y política en las respectivas producciones teóricas, la prioridad de la ética en el caso de Dussel y (...) la incidencia de esta diferencia relacionada a dicha prioridad en la consideración teórica de los conceptos de “pueblo” y “populismo” por parte de ambos autores. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo tem por objetivo apresentar o tema da corrupção, a partir da filosofia política de Enrique Dussel. No marco dos movimentos críticos que emergem no chamado Sul Global, a produção teórica de Dussel busca desenvolver uma estrutura que possibilite a crítica ao que denomina como fetichização do poder. Esse conteúdo é abordado como fundamento da corrupção das instituições que, despercebido pela tradição filosófica moderna, implica uma teoria política que legitima o poder corrompido. Na argumentação aqui concretizada, (...) será exposta a arquitetônica da política dusseliana, distinguindo os conceitos de potentia e potestas. Estes, por sua vez, permitem a diferenciação entre o uso delegado do poder e a execução corrompida do poder. Em seguida, será explicitado o movimento que Dussel assume da crítica de Marx à economia política, para, então, indicar o conteúdo material a partir do qual a constituição crítica de uma nova teoria política deve ser desenvolvida - inspirado em experiências políticas latino-americanas.: The purpose of this article is to present the theme of corruption, based on Enrique Dussel’s political philosophy. Under the scope of the critical movements that emerge in the so-called Global South, Dussel’s theoretical production aims to develop a structure that makes it possible to criticize what he calls the fetishization of power. The fetishization of power is presented as a foundation for the corruption of institutions that, unnoticed by the modern philosophical tradition, implies a political theory that legitimizes corrupted power. In our argument, we will expose the architecture of Dusselian politics, distinguishing the concepts of potentia and potestas. These concepts, in turn, allow for the differentiation between the delegated use of power and the corrupt execution of power. Then, we will make explicit the movement that Dussel assumes from Marx’s critique of political economy to indicate the material content from which the critical constitution of a new political theory must be developed - content that is inspired by Latin American political experiences. (shrink)

Este artículo ofrece un análisis y un comentario general de los dieciséis estudios que componen el libro compilado por Enrique Hülsz Piccone, Nuevos ensayos sobre Heráclito, el último compendio de investigaciones sobre la filosofía del Oscuro de Efe so, donde se reúnen las actas del Segundo Symposium Heracliteum celebrado en junio de 2006 en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la UNAM, ocasión en la que algunos de los especialistas más reconocidos de la comunidad internacional se reunieron para (...) presentar sus trabajos sobre Heráclito. This article aims to analyze and discuss the sixteen studies that compose the book edited by Enrique Hülsz Piccone, Nuevos ensayos sobre Heráclito, which is the latest compendium of studies on the philosophy of the Obscure of Ephesus. This volume gathers the proceedings of the Second Symposium Heracliteum held in June 2006 at the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, UNAM, where some of the most renowned specialists of the international community came together to present their work on Heraclitus. (shrink)